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Abstract
Security controls such as taint analysis and information flow
analysis can be powerful tools to protect against many common attacks. However, incorporating these controls into a
language such as JavaScript is challenging. Native implementations require the support of all JavaScript VMs. Code
rewriting requires developers to reason about the entire abstract syntax of JavaScript.
In this paper, we demonstrate how virtual values may be
used to more easily integrate these security controls. Virtual
values provide hooks to alter the behavior of primitive operations, allowing programmers to create the desired security
controls in a more declarative fashion, facilitating more rapid
prototyping.
We demonstrate how virtual values may be encoded in
JavaScript using a combination of JavaScript object proxies
and the Sweet.js macro library, and use that implementation
to build taint and information flow controls into JavaScript.
Finally, we show some benchmark results to demonstrate the
overhead of this approach.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.3 [Programming
Languages]: Language Constructs and Features; D.4.6
[Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—Information
Flow Controls
Keywords virtual values, macros, proxies, taint analysis,
information flow analysis

1. Introduction
Taint analysis is a powerful mechanism for preventing code
injection attacks. By tracking the flow of untrusted information, we can prevent its use in sensitive operations. For instance, we might require that data entered into a web form
must be sanitized before it is used with eval or as part of a
SQL query. Information flow analysis is a stronger extension
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of taint analysis that protects against data exfiltration, when
secret data is leaked to an unauthorized viewer.
Despite the power of these mechanisms, adoption has
been slow, in part because language designers must integrate
these controls into their runtime or their compilation process.
In this paper, we show how virtual values [4] can be
used by application developers to include taint or information flow controls without requiring support from the underlying JavaScript VM. Virtual values allow the application
developer to change the behavior of primitive operations; using this mechanism, developers can instrument their code to
track the flow of either tainted or confidential data.
We integrate virtual values into JavaScript using the
Sweet.js macro library [14, 15] and JavaScript proxies [10].
JavaScript’s proxies allow for behavioral intercession for
objects, but do not offer the same support for primitive values. Sweet.js macros allow us to convert primitive values
into JavaScript proxies with the additional behavioral hooks
needed for virtual values. (Virtual values retain the hooks
needed for object proxies, since primitive values can behave
like objects).
While our results show a high overhead for virtual values used in this manner, our approach allows developers to
include useful additions to the language without relying on
support in the underlying VM. Techniques to optimize the
performance of metaprogramming such as the use of dispatch chains [26] could reduce this overhead. Additionally,
if virtual values are shown to be useful, they could be implemented natively in the JavaScript VMs, which might further
improve their performance.

2. Virtual Values Using Sweet.js
JavaScript, as of the ES2015 standard [16], provides a powerful metaprogramming feature called object proxies [10]
that allow intercession on all of the standard operations for
JavaScript objects. In typical use, a proxy wraps an object,
mediating access to that object and changing its behavior.
Traps are functions on a handler object that dictate the be-

var vvalues = ( function () {
var unproxyMap = new WeakMap ();
function ValueShell ( value ) { this . value = value ;}
ValueShell . prototype . valueOf = function () {
return this . value ;
}
var oldProxy = this . Proxy ;
this . Proxy = function VProxy ( value , handler , key ) {
var valueShel l = new ValueShell ( value );
var val = ( value == null || typeof value !== ' object ') ? valueShell : value ;
var p = new oldProxy ( val , handler )
unproxyMap . set (p , {
handler : handler ,
key : key ,
target : val
});
return p ;
}
function isVProxy ( value ) {
return value && typeof value === ' object ' && unproxyMap . has ( value );
}
function unary ( operator , operand ) {
if ( isVProxy ( operand )) {
var target = unproxyMap . get ( operand ). target ;
return unproxyMap . get ( operand ). handler . unary ( target , operator , operand );
} else if ( operator === " -" ) {
return - operand ;
} /* ** ADDITIONAL UNARY OPERATORS REDACTED FOR SPACE ** */
}
function binary ( operator , left , right ) {
if ( isVProxy ( left )) {
var target = unproxyMap . get ( left ). target ;
return unproxyMap . get ( left ). handler . left ( target , operator , right );
} else if ( isVProxy ( right )) {
var target = unproxyMap . get ( right ). target ;
return unproxyMap . get ( right ). handler . right ( target , operator , left );
} else if ( operator === " * " ) {
return left * right ;
} /* ** ADDITIONAL BINARY OPERATORS REDACTED FOR SPACE ** */
}
function assign ( left , right , assignThu n k ) {
if ( isVProxy ( left ) || isVProxy ( right )) {
return unproxyMap . get ( left ). handler . assign ( left , right , assignThu nk );
} else {
return assignThun k ();
}
}
function test ( cond , branchExi t ) {
if ( isVProxy ( cond )) {
return unproxyMap . get ( cond ). handler . test ( cond , branchExit );
}
return cond ;
}
this . unproxy = function ( value , key ) {
if ( isVProxy ( value ) && unproxyMap . get ( value ). key === key )
return unproxyMap . get ( value ). handler ;
return null ;
};
return {
unary : unary ,
binary : binary ,
assign : assign ,
test :
test
};
})()

Figure 1. Virtual Values Harness

havior of the proxy. A wide variety of traps exist [27], such
as for getting, setting, or deleting properties from an object.
While JavaScript Proxies are a powerful tool for introducing new behavior to JavaScript objects, they unfortunately
cannot extend the behavior of primitive values (e.g. numbers, strings, and booleans).
Virtual values [4] are a proposed extension to object
proxies that add support for primitive values to proxies by
adding additional traps. This extension includes five additional hooks:
• unary - for unary operations.
• left - for binary operations, where the left operand is a

virtual value.
• right - for binary operations, where the right operand is

a virtual value.
• test - for cases where a virtual value is used as part of a

condition.
• assign - for assignment operations involving virtual val-

ues.
Virtual values have not been added to JavaScript but they
can be added via code rewriting, which we do in this paper by using Sweet.js [14, 15], a hygienic macro system for
JavaScript. Sweet.js allows us to rewrite the primitive operators in JavaScript (e.g. +, *, etc.) into the appropriate unary,
left, and right function calls. A harness invokes a trap if
an operand is a virtual value proxy, or performs the standard
JavaScript operation when the value is a primitive.
Figure 1 shows the harness code for creating virtual values. It decorates the Proxy object with support for primitive values. The primitive value is wrapped in an instance of
the ValueShell object, which is then treated as a standard
proxy. A mapping of the proxies to their handlers is maintained, allowing the handler for an object to be retrieved via
the unproxy function. A key object is used to allow proxies
to recognize themselves.
Operators specify the behavior for the virtual values. If an
operand for a unary operator is a virtual value (determined
by the isVProxy function), then the original value and the
handler for the value are retrieved from unproxyMap. The
unary function from the handler is then applied to the target,
the operator, and the operand. Binary operators are handled
in a similar manner by the binary function, though the code
is a little more complex. If the left operand is a virtual value,
the left handler for that value is used. If the left operand is
a normal value and the right operand is a virtual value, then
the right trap of the right operand is invoked. Otherwise,
the normal binary operation is applied.
Sweet.js macros allow the default behavior for operators
to be overridden. Using Sweet.js macros, all operators are
rewritten to use virtual values instead. (If an operator is not
specified for a virtual value, using that operator would cause
program execution to crash. A possible improvement for this
API would be for the standard behavior to be used instead,

in a manner similar to the design of JavaScript proxies.) The
following code shows the macros for handling the unary
operators ! and -, and the binary operators * and /. In
the example below, “13” and “14” specify the precedence
of the operator and left indicates that an operator is left
associative. The template for the generated code is specified
by the #{ ... } syntax.
operator ! 14 { $op }
=>
vvalues . unary ( " ! " , $op )
}
operator - 14 { $op }
=>
vvalues . unary ( " -" , $op )
}

#{

#{

operator * 13 left { $left , $right }
vvalues . binary ( " * " , $left , $right )
}
operator / 13 left { $left , $right }
vvalues . binary ( " / " , $left , $right )
}

= > #{

= > #{

We include support for tracking program influences
through the test and assign hooks. While these hooks
are not needed for many use cases, we use it in Section 4
to track leaks from the control flow of a program, generally
known as implicit flows. We speculate that the same extension could be useful for encoding symbolic execution and
other more elaborate tools.
2.1 Performance overhead
In order to better understand the baseline for our system,
we modified the popular SunSpider JavaScript performance
benchmark [35] to include virtual values. We chose the
SunSpider benchmark, as it is focuses on a wide range of
JavaScript features from Date, String, and Regexp manipulation to a wide variety of numerical, array-oriented, objectoriented, and functional idioms. No other changes were done
to the benchmark, and the virtual values in these tests pass
through all operations without otherwise changing behavior, allowing us to establish the baseline overhead of virtual
values alone.
These tests were run on a Mac Book Pro with one 2.6
GHz Intel Core i7 processor containing 4 cores, 16 GB of
RAM, and an Intel Iris Pro graphics processor with 1536
MB of memory. We used the Sweet.js compiler version
0.7.8 to translate version 1.02 of the SunSpider benchmark.
Three tests cases (3d/raytrace, crypto/aes, date/format-tofte)
were excluded from the testing since they contain minified
JavaScript that made modification difficult. The resulting
code was tested on Safari, Chrome, and Firefox.
Table 1 shows the results of our testing. In all cases,
virtual values introduce significant overhead. Interestingly,
though Safari performed best without Sweet.js, Chrome’s
results were best on the Sweet.js-compiled code.
Rewriting JavaScript operations into function calls comes
with a certain performance penalty. Despite the significant
overhead, it is not atypical for code-rewriting approaches [8,
9]. We are hopeful that future version of JavaScript might

one day support virtual values natively, eliminating the cost
of introducing virtual values.
For future work, we plan to augment the Sweet.js virtual
value compiler to identify expressions that do not involve
proxies during the parse phase and avoid the rewriting operations into function calls.

3. Taint Analysis
Taint analysis is a language feature that tracks and restricts
the flow of data through a program. Taint analysis is accomplished by programmers indicating which inputs should be
tracked and which outputs should not accept tainted values.
This prevents common programming mistakes such as failing to sanitize user input. Previous research has used taint
tracking to detect application vulnerabilities [29, 37], and it
is a built-in feature of languages such as Perl and Ruby.
While taint analysis is not currently available in JavaScript,
the browser is a rich setting for all number of potentially unsafe inputs that could benefit from taint analysis. As one
example, we might wish to prevent a string taken from a
form element from being passed to eval. By tracking this
information, we can allow it to be used freely up until the
point where it might be used in an unsafe manner.
3.1 Taint Analysis API
Our JavaScript API for taint analysis consists of three functions provided to the programmer: taint, isTainted, and
endorse. The taint function takes a value and taints it, the
isTainted function takes a value and returns true if the
value is tainted, and the endorse function removes the taint
from a value. The following code shows the use of this API:
var username =
taint ( " Robert '); DROP TABLE Students ; - - " );
var query = " select * from Students " +
" where username = '" + username + " '" );
if ( isTainted ( query ))
throw new Error ( " Tainted query " );

Note that a tainted value must be propagated through
primitive operations that create new values. In the above
example the concatenation of username with other strings
must result in query being tainted as well.
Leveraging object proxies and virtual values, the code
required to implement taint and isTainted is pleasingly
minimal. Figure 2 shows the required functions to introduce
taint analysis controls.
The taint function wraps a value inside a virtual value
where the unary, left, and right hooks propagate the
taint onto the result of the computation, performed by applying functions in the unaryOps and binaryOps arrays. The
unaryOps and binaryOps objects map symbols to functions performing the default behavior for the given operator.
The taintingKey used in the taint function allows the
isTainted function to detect when a value is tainted. It also
is used to retrieve the original, untainted value of a virtual
value using the endorse function.

// this object is used to identify proxies
// crated by the ` taint ` function
var taintingKe y = {};
function taint ( o r i g i n a l V a l u e ) {
if ( isTainted ( o r i g i n a l V a l u e )) {
return o r i g i n a l V a l u e ;
}
var p = new Proxy ( originalValue , {
// Store the original untainted
// value for later .
o r i g i n a l V a l u e : originalValue ,
unary : function ( target , op , operand ) {
return taint ( unaryOps [ op ]( target ));
},
left : function ( target , op , right ) {
return taint ( binaryOps [ op ]( target ,
right ));
},
right : function ( target , op , left ) {
return taint ( binaryOps [ op ]( left ,
target ));
}
} , taintingK ey );
return p ;
}
function isTainted ( x ) {
// a value is tainted if it is a proxy
// created with the ' taintingK ey '
if ( unproxy (x , taintingK ey )) {
return true ;
}
return false ;
}
function endorse ( value ) {
if ( isTainted ( value )) {
// pulls the value out of
// its tainting proxy
return unproxy ( value ,
taintingK ey ). o r i g i n a l V a l u e ;
}
return value ;
}

Figure 2. Taint Analysis Functions

3.2 Performance Tests for Taint Tracking
While Table 1 shows the baseline overhead of virtual values,
we also wish to evaluate the overhead of leveraging virtual
values to implement security controls.
We use the validate-input test case in Sun Spider to
determine the additional overhead introduced by taint tracking. 4000 email addresses and zip codes are generated and
validated using regular expressions. We tainted a portion of
these email addresses and zip codes. Table 2 shows the results; while virtual values add significant performance overhead, using them for taint analysis adds comparatively little additional load. Despite an exponential increase in the
amount of tainted variables, the performance overhead increases only slightly.

Test
3d
cube
morph
access
binary-trees
fannkuch
nbody
nsieve
bitops
3bit-bits-in-byte
bits-in-byte
bitwise-and
nsieve-bits
controlflow
recursive
crypto
md5
sha1
date
format-xparb
math
cordic
partial-sums
spectral-norm
regexp
dna
string
base64
fasta
tagcloud
validate-input
Total

Safari
Base Virtual Values
10.0ms
73.3ms
5.0ms
31.8ms
5.0ms
41.5ms
13.0ms
122.0ms
2.2ms
8.7ms
5.2ms
72.6ms
2.6ms
23.0ms
3.0ms
17.7ms
9.1ms
159.1ms
1.0ms
30.0ms
3.0ms
35.0ms
2.0ms
28.5ms
3.1ms
65.6ms
2.1ms
14.4ms
2.1ms
14.4ms
5.0ms
42.0ms
2.4ms
21.0ms
2.6ms
21.0ms
5.2ms
9.3ms
5.2ms
9.3ms
9.3ms
81.2ms
3.0ms
40.7ms
4.3ms
15.0ms
2.0ms
25.5ms
5.7ms
5.3ms
5.7ms
5.3ms
23.7ms
81.5ms
4.3ms
22.2ms
6.1ms
25.1ms
8.9ms
19.5ms
4.4ms
14.7ms
83.1ms
588.1ms
(7.1x slowdown)

Chrome
Base Virtual Values
18.0ms
75.5ms
8.8ms
33.3ms
9.2ms
42.2ms
11.5ms
101.7ms
1.5ms
7.9ms
5.6ms
55.4ms
2.1ms
23.0ms
2.3ms
15.4ms
18.9ms
126.5ms
1.0ms
25.7ms
3.8ms
30.9ms
11.1ms
25.5ms
3.0ms
44.4ms
1.3ms
10.6ms
1.3ms
10.6ms
7.3ms
41.7ms
3.6ms
20.3ms
3.7ms
21.4ms
11.2ms
15.7ms
11.2ms
15.7ms
12.9ms
77.9ms
3.0ms
36.6ms
7.9ms
21.9ms
2.0ms
19.4ms
5.5ms
6.2ms
5.5ms
6.2ms
43.8ms
88.5ms
4.2ms
19.2ms
11.4ms
22.7ms
22.3ms
30.2ms
5.9ms
16.4ms
130.4ms
544.3ms
(4.2x slowdown)

Firefox
Base Virtual Values
17.0ms
80.9ms
12.6ms
44.2ms
4.5ms
36.7ms
13.9ms
139.3ms
3.0ms
10.9ms
5.5ms
83.7ms
2.8ms
21.8ms
2.6ms
22.9ms
7.7ms
222.4ms
0.8ms
46.3ms
1.6ms
53.2ms
2.2ms
43.7ms
3.1ms
79.2ms
2.0ms
16.0ms
2.0ms
16.0ms
6.7ms
62.0ms
3.7ms
30.6ms
3.0ms
31.4ms
11.1ms
33.2ms
11.1ms
33.2ms
10.4ms
88.0ms
2.2ms
46.6ms
6.6ms
18.6ms
1.6ms
22.8ms
6.6ms
7.9ms
6.6ms
7.9ms
30.9ms
101.9ms
5.7ms
28.8ms
6.0ms
25.1ms
13.2ms
30.6ms
6.0ms
17.4ms
142.3ms
751.6ms
(5.3x slowdown)

Table 1. SunSpider Performance with Virtual Values
Num. of Variables
4000
4000
4000
4000
4000
4000

Tainted Variables
40
80
160
320
640
1280

Time
18.6ms
19.1ms
19.1ms
19.2ms
19.3ms
19.5ms

Table 2. Taint Performance Test Results

4. Information Flow Analysis
Information flow analysis extends taint analysis to handle
confidentiality concerns; that is, it is focused on protecting
secret information from being leaked, rather than preventing

code injection attacks. Early work on information flow analysis focused on static approaches, such as Denning’s strategy of including an information flow certification component in a compiler [11, 12], or information flow type systems [20, 38]. While these techniques have been studied
widely for statically typed languages, such as the Java-like
Jif language [22, 28] and FlowCaml [30], they seem less fitting for dynamic languages. Dynamic information flow analysis for JavaScript in particular has been the source of significant attention [7, 9, 13, 19, 23, 24, 32, 34].
In addition to the explicit flows of information handled in
taint analysis, with information flow analysis we must also
consider implicit flows, where an attacker learns information
through the control flow of the program. For a simple exam-

x=
Function f(x)
y = true;
z = true;
if (x)
y = false;
if (y)
z = false;
return z;
Return Value:

falseH
Both strategies
y = true
z = true
−
−
pc = L
z = false
−
false

trueH
Naive
NSU
y = true
y = true
z = true
z = true
pc = H
pc = H
y = falseH
stuck
−
−
−
true

Figure 3. A JavaScript function with implicit flows

ple, consider the following code with an implicit flow from
the secret variable sec to the public output:
var sec = secret ( true );
var pub = false ;
if ( sec ) {
pub = true ;
}
console . log ( pub )

Although an attacker cannot observe sec, the public
value of pub reveals the value of sec, even though there
has been no direct assignment from sec to pub. Unlike taint
tracking, information flow analysis assumes that attackers
can control some portion of the code, and therefore can build
sophisticated implicit flows if they are not tracked correctly.
Implicit flows are surprisingly complex to handle correctly. Figure 4 shows an example to illustrate these challenges, adapted from a code example first discovered by
Fenton [17]. We review two strategies: the “naive” strategy
marks data as confidential, denoted by the superscript H for
“high”, whenever it is updated in a sensitive context; the nosensitive-upgrade strategy [1, 39], given in the N SU column, instead terminates execution when confidential information might be leaked.
If this function is called with a secret false value, denoted falseH , then both approaches handle execution in
the same manner. Since x is falseH , y remains true and
public. Therefore, z is updated to false in the second conditional, and remains public.
If the function is instead called with trueH , the naive
approach tracks the sensitive influence in the first conditional
statement by setting the program counter to confidential
(pc = H), and tracks its influence by setting y to falseH .
Therefore, no update to z is performed, and its value remains
false and public, thereby leaking one bit of data.
To prevent against this implicit leak, the N SU strategy
disallows updates to public references in a confidential context. When y is updated, execution “gets stuck” and terminates the application. More permissive approaches exist for
dynamically handling these cases, such as the permissiveupgrade strategy [2, 6], secure multi-execution [13, 21, 31],

let key = {};
let pcStack = [];
function secret ( o r i g i n a l V a l u e ) {
if ( isSecret ( o r i g i n a l V a l u e )) {
return o r i g i n a l V a l u e ;
}
var p = new Proxy ( originalValue , {
o r i g i n a l V a l u e : originalValue ,
unary : function ( target , op , operand ) {
return secret ( unaryOps [ op ]( target ));
},
left : function ( target , op , right ) {
return secret ( binaryOps [ op ]( target , right ));
},
right : function ( target , op , left ) {
return secret ( binaryOps [ op ]( left , target ));
}
test : function ( cond , branchExi t ) {
if ( cond ) {
pcStack . push ( cond );
branchExit (() = > {
pcStack . pop ();
})
}
return cond ;
},
assign : function ( left , right , assignThun k ) {
if ( pcStack . length > 0) {
throw new Error ( " Implicit leak " );
}
assignThu n k ();
}
} , key );
return p ;
}
function isSecret ( x ) {
return unproxy (x , key );
}

Figure 4. Information Flow Functions

and faceted values [5, 33]. We select the NSU approach for
illustrative purposes since it is easier to understand.
Using virtual values and Sweet.js macros, we can implement the NSU strategy within JavaScript. To detect implicit
flows, we need to maintain a program counter (pc) of influences on the current execution.
Our implementation in Figure 1 provides the appropriate
hooks to track the program counter. Tracking the pc is accomplished by extending the test handler (which traps an
if statement) with a branchExit registration parameter. The
branchExit parameter is a function that takes a callback to be
invoked once the if statement’s then branch has completed.
The extended test handler allows our implementation of
NSU (see Figure 4) to push and pop “influence” (represented
by a virtual value) onto a program counter stack.
To prevent implicit flows, the assign handler looks on the
program counter stack to see if it is inside of a high security
context; if so, it throws an error. To implement the test
handler, we use a Sweet.js macro to expand if statements
into the appropriate virtual values calls. Macros in Sweet.js

use the following form, where <pattern> gives the pattern
to match in the input program and <template> gives the
pattern of the generated code.
macro {
rule {
< pattern >
} => {
< template >
}
}

The macro for if statements shows how we can change
the behavior of control structures to track information flow.
macro if {
rule { ( $cond ...) { $body ...} } = > {
function exit () { } // by default no - op
if ( vvalues . test ( $cond ... ,
cb = > exit = cb )) {
$body ...
exit ();
}
}
}

We also need to modify how assignment behaves, which
we can do by using Sweet.js infix macros. Infix macros allow
us to match syntax before the distinguishing identifier.
macro = {
rule infix { $left | $right : expr } = > {
vvalues . assign ( $left , $right , () = > {
$left = $right
});
}
}

5. Related Work
The original paper on virtual values [4] gives the hooks necessary to support primitive values in JavaScript. While it
only has a proof-of-concept implementation, many interesting use cases are demonstrated. We extend that work with
additional features to support more advanced use cases, like
information flow analysis. Additionally, we show how virtual values can be encoded into JavaScript through a combination of JavaScript proxies and Sweet.js macros.
JavaScript proxies [10] are closely related to virtual values. Proxies only support operations for objects, making
them ineffective for certain types of analysis.
Christophe et al. [8] develop Linvail for JavaScript, providing a general purpose framework for dynamic analysis in
JavaScript. This work also demonstrates how taint analysis
could be supported, and discusses the challenges of tracking
primitive values in JavaScript.
Rewriting code to ensure security guarantees has been
used in several domains. Maffeis and Taly [25] explore
the guarantees for these tools for JavaScript specifically.
Caja [18] uses a “cajoler” that rewrites code to follow the
object capabilities model, thereby preventing untrusted code
from accessing powerful libraries. Taly et al. [36] formalize
a subset of JavaScript and use it to analyze these code rewriting APIs. Chudnov and Naumann [9] rewrite JavaScript

code to provide information flow guarantees using the nosensitive-upgrade approach. The main benefit of our approach is that, once the correct virtual values hooks are
available, the security controls can be rewritten in a more
declarative approach, without needing to consider the complete abstract syntax of JavaScript.

6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have demonstrated how virtual values may
be implemented in JavaScript using proxies and Sweet.js
macros. We have further shown how taint tracking and information flow analysis can be implemented using virtual values. By showing how these security controls can be implemented within a language using various metaprogramming
techniques, we hope to accelerate adoption of security tools.
Sweet.js has recently gone through a major redesign. For
future work, we intend to extend our design to work with
the latest version of the library, and also to explore how
additional security mechanisms such as faceted values [3]
can be encoded through virtual values.
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